Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
Volume 9
Issue 3 Winter
Winter 1989

Does Exposure to International Trade Justify
Relaxed Antitrust Treatment of Mergers
William James Adams

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the International Trade Commons
Recommended Citation
William James Adams, Does Exposure to International Trade Justify Relaxed Antitrust Treatment of Mergers, 9 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.
589 (1988-1989)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

Does Exposure to International Trade

Justify Relaxed Antitrust Treatment
of Mergers?
William James Adams*

When industries are exposed to foreign competition, relaxation of
antitrust law in general, and of antimerger law in particular, may be justified in two ways. First, it may be argued that the ability to compete
with foreigners requires possession of market power. One variant of this
argument stresses the desirability of market power itself. Domestic enterprises must neutralize restrictive practices abroad-whether they are
inspired by foreign governments or merely tolerated by them-if such
enterprises are to enjoy their "natural" comparative advantages. A second variant of the argument emphasizes the growth of minimum efficient
scale in manufacturing, due in no small measure to the rising importance
of invention and innovation. In this variant, the market power acquired
by domestic firms, through merger or restrictive practices, is thought to
be an unfortunate, but necessary, by-product of achieving productive and
dynamic efficiency. Several recent studies,1 including one published in
this Journal,2 have questioned the wisdom of this first argument, and
* Professor of Economics and Adjunct Professor of Law, The University of Michigan; author of
RESTRUCTURING THE FRENCH ECONOMY: GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF MARKET COMPETITION SINCE WORLD WAR II (1989).
1 See Caves, Effects of Mergers and Acquistions on the Economy: An Industrial Organization

Perspective,in THE MERGER BOOM (L. Browne & E. Rosengren eds. 1988); W. ADAMS & J. BROCK,
THE BIGNESS COMPLEX (1987).
2 Adams & Brock, The Bigness Mystique and the Merger Policy Debatea An InternationalPerspective, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1 (1988). Adams and Brock argue as follows: the governments of
several rich market economies have tolerated and even promoted major mergers since World War II;
retrospective evidence suggests that these mergers failed to augment the profitability or the productivity of the combining enterprises; as a result, the foreign experience does not contradict the wisdom
of restoring stringency to American regulation of mergers-of returning to the treatment that ex-

isted before the implementation of the Reagan guidelines.
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consequently I shall ignore it here. Instead, I shall focus on a second
argument: that the existence of foreign competition eliminates both actual and potential reduction of competition that might otherwise result
from market conduct, or from market positions, challenged by antitrust
authorities. In this view, competition remains a desirable policy objective; yet it is achieved not through antitrust intervention but through the
market mechanism of international trade.
To what extent does failure to take account of foreign competition
result in overestimation of the anticompetitive consequences of domestic
mergers? Many studies suggest that across manufacturing industries,
market power (measured by long-run profitability) varies negatively with
exposure to imports.3 Studies of particular industries also suggest that
across industrialized nations, seller-concentration varies negatively with
exposure to imports.4 As a result, the thoughtful framer of antitrust policy must ascertain whether foreign sellers account for major fractions of
American markets, and whether American producers sell considerable
fractions of their output in foreign markets which they fail to dominate.
If the findings in each case are affirmative, then American levels of producer-concentration may systematically and substantially overestimate
the levels of seller-concentration in markets supplied by American enterprises. For this and other reasons, they may overestimate the anticompetitive consequences of mergers.
To calibrate the exposure of American industries to foreign trade, I
shall compare the American situation with the situation in France.
Among industrialized nations, France is often considered to be relatively
protectionist in matters of international trade. Hence, my interest is in
determining how exposed American enterprises are to international trade
in comparison with their French counterparts.
Using information gathered by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"),5 it is possible to examine the
ratio of imports to consumption, and the ratio of exports to output, in
identically-defined French and American industries. The information reported herein relates to 1982, the year the first Reagan merger guidelines
3 See Jacquemin, de Ghellinck & Huveneers, Concentration and Profitability in a Small Open

Economy, 29 J. INDUS. ECON. 131 (1980); Pugel, Foreign Trade and US Market Performance, 29 J.
INDUS. ECON. 119 (1980); and Jenny & Weber, Profit Rates and Structural Variables in French

ManufacturingIndustries, 7 EUR. ECON. REV. 187 (1976).
4 See Adams, Producer-Concentrationas a Proxyfor Seller-Concentration:Some Evidencefrom
the World Automotive Industry, 29 J. INDUS. EON. 185 (1980).
5 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE STATISTICS, 1984 (1986).

International Trade and Antitrust

9:589(1989)
took effect.6 In manufacturing as a whole, the ratio of imports to domestic consumption ("import ratio") was 25% in France and 9% in the
United States. The ratio of exports to production ("export ratio") was
26% in France and 8% in the United States. In other words, the incidence of international trade on domestic manufacturers was three times
as great in France as in the United States.
The importance of trade can vary, of course, among industries
within the manufacturing sector. To what extent do figures on the entire
manufacturing sector represent accurately the situation in particular industries? The OECD data permit decomposition of manufacturing into
twenty-eight industries, a level of aggregation lying between the two- and

three-digit
levels of the United States Standard Industrial Classification
7

("SIC",).
Looking first at imports, in twenty-seven of the twenty-eight indus-

tries,8 the French import ratio exceeds its American counterpart. The
average gap between the two ratios is eighteen percentage points.9 Table

1 shows the distribution of value-added among manufacturing industries
classified according to import-exposure. Nearly two-thirds of American
value-added, but less than one-tenth of French value-added, is generated
in industries with import ratios below 10%. On the other hand, nearly
half of French value-added, but only one-hundredth of American valueadded, is generated in industries with import ratios of 30% or more.

Clearly, the French exposure to imports is as pervasive as it is intense.
Turning to exports, the French export ratio exceeds that of the
6 During 1982, the United States dollar tended to be strong, while the French franc tended to be
weak. As a result, ratios of imports to consumption may be abnormally high in the United States.
Similarly, ratios of exports to output may be abnormally low in France and abnormally high in
France and abnormally low in the United States. The Merger Guidelines adopted by the Department of Justice in 1982 and 1984 are set forth in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,102-13,103.
7 In order to facilitate the classification of establishments by economic activity, and to promote
the collection, presentation and comparability of data from those establishments, the SIC was formulated as the statistical classification standard underlying all establishment-based economic statistics
classified by industry in the United States. The SIC covers the entire field of economic activity and
defines industries according to the composition and structure of the economy, and it is used to
promote the comparability of establishment data describing various facets of the United States economy. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION MANUAL (1987). Similarly, the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic
Activities ("ISIC") was adopted by the United Nations to provide a framework for the international
comparison of national statistics classifying establishments based upon economic activity. See U.N.
DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICA-

TION OF ALL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES, U.N. Doc. ST/STAT/SER.M/4/Rev. 2, U.N. Sales No. E.
68, XVII.8 (1968).
8 All save footwear (ISIC 324).
9 The average import ratio was 28% in France and 11% in the United States. The gap differs
positively from 0 at the .001 level of statistical significance in a two-tail t-test.
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United States in twenty-seven of the twenty-eight industries. 0 On average, the export ratio is 26% in France but only 7% in the United
States.1 1 Table 2 shows the distribution of value-added among manufacturing industries, classified according to export-exposure. Only one
French industry, but twelve American industries, display export ratios of
less than 5%. On the other hand, eighteen French industries, but only
one American industry, display export ratios of 20% or more. Unlike
their French counterparts, most American industries sell the overwhelming bulk of their output at home. Even if foreign markets function competitively, their relevance to American enterprises is too tenuous to affect
the degree of competitive pressure they experience.
French industries are heavily exposed to international trade, while
American industries are not. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that
industries with relatively high import ratios in France (by French standards) tend also to show relatively high import ratios in the United States
(by American standards). For example, the printing and publishing industry (International Standard Industrial Classification ["ISIC"] 342)
exhibits a relatively low import ratio in both countries, while the footwear industry (ISIC 324) exhibits a relatively high import ratio in both
countries. Exceptions to this synchrony do exist-the textile industry
(ISIC 321) shows relatively great exposure to imports in France but not
in the United States-but, statistically speaking, French and American
import ratios are positively correlated. 2 French and American export
ratios are also positively correlated. 13 Furniture and fixtures (ISIC 332)
illustrates a relatively low export ratio in both countries; machinery
(ISIC 382) illustrates a relatively high export ratio in both countries; and
miscellaneous petroleum and coal products (ISIC 354) illustrates the occasional discrepancy of ratios (relatively high in France, average to low
in the United States).
In Tables 1 and 2, industries are defined very broadly. Each industry contains many economically distinct lines of business. If industries
are defined more narrowly, does one observe greater variation among industries in import and export ratios? To answer this question, one must
rely on data reported at the national level. The disadvantage of these
data is the incongruity of French and American schemes of industrial
classification. Unlike the OECD information, reported according to
ISIC for both countries, the national information cannot be compared at
10
11
12
13

All save tobacco (ISIC 314).
The gap differs positively from 0 at the .001 level of statistical significance in a two-tail t-test.
At the .05 level of statistical significance in a one-tail t-test.
At the .01 level of statistical significance in a one-tail t-test.
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the industry level. On the other hand, the OECD's information is derived from these national data; the national figures are certainly of higher
quality.
Table 3 shows the distribution of American manufacturing industries, narrowly defined, by exposure to imports and exports. Although
several such industries are heavily exposed to imports (see Table 4), and
others sell heavily in foreign markets (see Table 5), the numbers in each
case are small in relation to the total number of industries observed.
Furthermore, the industries included in these tables are not, by and large,
the targets of strict merger regulation; 14 nor would they be under the preReagan guidelines. International trade does not obviously tend to im-

pinge heavily on industries especially prone to major mergers. In most
instances, recalculation of concentration ratios to account for foreign
competition, at home and abroad, would not alter the apparent wisdom
of curbing a major American merger. 5

If international trade should be taken into account in the regulation
of mergers, the place to do it is in countries like France where exports
and imports impinge heavily and pervasively on manufacturing indus-

tries.16 In fact, it is more than possible that the failure of major mergers

in Europe can be attributed to the persistent impact of market forces,
transmitted through international trade, on European producers. After
all, productive inefficiency would not have resulted in negative profits

had the European national champions enjoyed substantial amounts of
market power. It is precisely because so many American producers are
14 It is beyond the scope of this article to correlate across American four-digit manufacturing
industries the frequency of merger activity and the exposure to either imports or exports. On the
other hand, it is interesting to examine the number of indictments for criminal violation of the
Sherman Act in industries heavily exposed to international trade, as identified in Tables 4 and 5.
(Data on indictments taken from . CLABAULT & M. BLOCH, I & 2 SHERMAN ACT INDICTMENTS
1955-1980, at 688, 1053-70 (1981). Between 1955 and 1980, 617 such cases were brought. Of these,
just seven concerned the 23 industries of Table 4; and just another seven concerned the 12 industries
of Table 5. These results are not surprising: most Sherman Act indictments involve conspiracies to
fix prices in a domestic market, and such conspiracies are unlikely to develop where potential conspirators face substantial import competition in the domestic market or sell large fractions of their
output in foreign markets.
15 Although it involved prosecution for monopolization rather than for merger, United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (1945), illustrates the point. Assuming the relevant product market was primary aluminum ingot, Alcoa was a literal monopolist if imports were
excluded by definition from the market; with imports included, Alcoa's market share remained
above 90 percent.
16 Import and export ratios for narrowly defined French industries, confirming the broad impact
of international trade on French manufacturing, appear in W.

ADAMS,

RESTRUCTURING THE

FRENCH ECONOMY: GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF MARKET COMPETITION SINCE WORLD WAR

II ch. 4 (1989).
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naturally or artificially protected from competition through international
trade that vigor must be restored to United States regulation of mergers.
Table 1:

Distribution of Value-Added in Manufacturing by Exposure
to Imports, France and the United States, 1982

Import ratio
0 to 4
5 to 9
10 to 19
20 to 29
30 to 39
40 to 49
50 or more
0 or more
Source:

Number of industries
France
USA

28

28

Percent of
value-added
France
USA
35.8
29.9
22.5
31.9
1.8
21.2
39.2
0.5
0.0
9.7
0.0
0.1
100.0

ECONOMIC
COOPERATION
ORGANIZATION
FOR
DEVELOPMENT, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE STATISTICS, 1984 (1986).

100.0
AND

Note: Import ratio is (100)(M)/(Q-X+M), where M is imports, Q is
production, and X is exports.
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Table 2:

Distribution of Value-Added in Manufacturing by Exposure
to Exports, France and the United States, 1982

Export ratio
0
5
10
20
30
40
50

to
to
to
to
to
to
or

Number of industries
France
USA

4
9
19
29
39
49
more

0 or more

28

28

Percent of
value-added
France
USA
1.2
5.9
25.3
12.7
37.0
17.8
0.1
100.0

Source:
ORGANIZATION
FOR
ECONOMIC
COOPERATION
DEVELOPMENT, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE STATISTICS, 1984 (1986).

Note: Export ratio is (100)(X)/(Q),
production.

32.7
24.4
29.9
12.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
AND

where X is exports and Q is

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

Table 3:

9:589(1989)

Distribution of American Manufacturing Industries by
Exposure to International Trade, 1982

Import ratio
0 to 9
10 to 19
20 to 29
30 to 39
40 to 49
50 or more
0 or more

Number of
industries

Export ratio
0 to 9
10 to 19
20 to 29
30 to 39
40 to 49
50 or more

Number of
industries
114
80
31
4
5

94
60
30
7
8
8
207
0 or more
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. U.S.
Commodity Exports and Imports as Related to Output: 1982 and 1981, tables
1A and lB.
Note: Four-digit manufacturing industries importing (column 1) or
exporting (column 2) $10 million or more of merchandise during 1982. Import
ratio is imports c.i.f. as percent of new supply (domestic output plus imports).
Export ratio is exports f.o.b. as percent of domestic output.
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Table 4:

American Manufacturing Industries Heavily Exposed to
Imports, 1982

Code
2294
23851
3253
3143
3313
2292
3161
2381
3552
2429
3144
3269
3171
3262
3873
3651
3942
3636
2279
3751
2386
3263
3339

Industry
Textile goods nec
Raincoats, waterproof outer garments
Ceramic wall and floor tile
Men's footwear, except athletic
Electrometallurgical products
Lace and net goods
Luggage
Gloves nec
Textile machinery
Shingles, shakes, cooperage stock nec
Women's footwear, except athletic
Pottery products nec
Women's handbags and purses
Vitreous china table and kitchen articles
Watches, clocks, and watchcases
Radio receivers, TV sets, phonographs, etc.
Dolls and stuffed toy animals
Sewing machines and parts
Carpets and rugs nec
Motorcycles, bicycles, and parts
Leather and sheep lined clothing
Fine earthenware food utensils
Nonferrous smelting/refining products nee

Import Ratio
32
32
32
33
35
37
37
40
40
42
42
43
46
47
47
50
50
51
53
55
56
70
77

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. U.S.
Commodity Exports and Imports as Related to Output: 1982 and 1981, table
lB.
Notes: Four-digit manufacturing industries for which (1) the import ratio
(imports c.i.f. as percent of new supply, where new supply is domestic output
plus imports) was 30 percent or more, and (2) imports were $10 million or more.
As in source, some listed industries contain parts of certain unlisted industries.
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American Manufacturing Industries Especially Prone to
Exports, 1982

Code Industry
Export Ratio
3511 Turbines and turbine generator sets
33
2292 Lace and net goods
34
2833 Medicinals and botanicals
34
3721 Aircraft
34
2611 Pulp mill products
41
3728 Aircraft parts and auxiliary equipment
41
3531 Construction machinery
46
3636 Sewing machines and parts
47
3829 Measuring and controlling devices nec
47
2999 Petroleum and coal products nec
51
2044 Milled rice and by-products
52
3533 Oil-field machinery
54
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. U.S.
Commodity Exports and Imports as Related to Output: 1982 and 1981, table
1A.
Notes: Four-digit manufacturing industries for which (1) the export ratio
(exports f.o.b. as percent of domestic output) was 30 percent or more, and (2)
exports were $10 million or more. Industry 3829 includes industry 38244.

